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FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION SANCTIONS ON
JAPANESE CARRIERS: A CALL FOR FAIRER METHODS
OF RESOLVING DISPUTES
Randy L. Baldemor
Abstract: On February 26, 1997, the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission imposed
sanctions upon Japanese shipping carriers for allegedly restrictive port practices that
existed in Japan. The Federal Maritime Commission imposed the sanctions under
Section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Section 19 gives the Federal Maritime
Commission authority to make rules and regulations where conditions unfavorable to
shipping in the foreign trade exist. However, the Japanese Government does not control
the port practices in Japan. The Japan Harbor Transportation Authority, a private
conglomeration of labor unions, shippers, and other shipping entities in Japan, regulates
port practices through collective-bargaining negotiations. By using Section 19 authority
to force a change in Japanese port practices, the U.S. Government unilaterally interfered
in internal labor-management relations within a foreign country. Such action is unfair, in
light of the fact that such collective-bargaining agreements would be considered valid
labor agreements in the United States. In the future, the United States should pursue
other alternatives, such as the World Trade Organization's multilateral dispute resolution
mechanism, to provide a fairer method of resolving such disputes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Under Section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the U.S.
Federal Maritime Commission ("FMC") has the authority to regulate
conditions that are unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade of the United
States.' Recently, the FMC imposed sanctions against Japanese carriers in
an attempt to force the Japanese government to correct allegedly restrictive
port practices in Japan.2 By taking such action, the FMC tested the bounds
of its authority to interfere in the collective bargaining arrangements of a
foreign country. Because such arrangements would be considered valid
labor agreements in the U.S., a double standard has been created when such
arrangements are considered invalid in Japan by the FMC. When faced with
such a predicament in the future, a better solution would be for the United
States government to pursue other alternatives, such as action through a
multilateral dispute resolution body like the World Trade Organization.
46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (1)(b) (1994).
2 Port Restrictions and.Requirements in the United States/Japan Trade Final Rule, Docket No. 96-20
(FMC, 1997) (46 C. F. R. pt. 586) [hereinafter Port Restrictions, Final Rule], amended by Amendment to
Final Rule, Docket No. 96-20 (FMC, 1997) [hereinafter Final Rule Amendment], suspended by Final Rule:
Suspension of Effectiveness, Docket No. 96-20 (FMC. 1997) [hereinafter Final Rule Suspension] (visited
May 12, 1998) <http://www.fmc.gov/96-20f.htm>.
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On September 12, 1995, the FMC began investigating Japanese
shipping laws to determine whether they created conditions unfavorable to
shipping in the United States and Japan trade.3 Based on the investigation,
the Federal Maritime Commission concluded that unfavorable conditions
existed in the form of restrictive port practices that were imposed by the
Japan Harbor Transportation Authority ("JHTA"), a private-sector Japanese
stevedore4  association which governs Japanese port conditions. On
February 26, 1997, the Federal Maritime Commission issued a "Final Rule"
in response to these unfavorable conditions. 6 Operating under Section 19 of
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 7 the FMC imposed a $100,000 sanction
each time a Japanese-flag container-carrying liner vessel entered a U.S. port
from abroad.8 However, the "Final Rule" was suspended until September 4,
1997 to allow the Japanese government to begin to reform the unfavorable
conditions. 9 No agreements were reached in Japan to reform port practices
in the period between the FMC's suspension of the sanctions to the deadline
of September 4, 1997.10
As a result of the Japanese government's failure to reform the port
practices, from September 5, 1997 to late October 1997, sanctions accrued
against Japanese carrier lines: Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha,
3 Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. app. § 876(i)(b) (1994), the Federal Maritime
Commission's (FMC) authority extends to the following:
[t]o make rules and regulations affecting shipping in the foreign trade not in conflict with law in
order to adjust or meet general or special conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade,
whether in any particular trade or upon any particular route or in commerce generally, including
intermodal movements, terminal operations, cargo solicitation, forwarding and agency services,
non-vessel-operating common carrier operations, and other activities and services integral to
transportation systems, and which arise out of or result from foreign laws, rules, or regulations or
from competitive methods or practices employed by owners, operators, agents, or masters of
vessels of a foreign country.
See Port Restrictions and Requirements in the United States/Japan Trade-Information Demand Order, 27
SRR 324 (FMC, 1995).
A "stevedore" is another name for a longshore worker.
See Port Restrictions, Final Rule.
6 Id. at 1.7 46 U.S.C. app. § 876(l)(b) (1994).
8 See Port Restrictions, Final Rule. This "Final Rule" was amended on April 14, 1997. The
amendment imposed a fee of $ 100,000, assessed each time a designated vessel entered any port of the United
States from any foreign port or place; provided, however, that no fee would be assessed against a designated
vessel if (1) within the past seven days, or (2) for a vessel calling in the state of Hawaii, that vessel had
previously been assessed a fee under the rule within the past forty days. See Final Rule Amendment.
' See Final Rule Suspension. The "Final Rule" was suspended based on the premise that the JapaneseGovernment would provide a framework for reforming the prior consultation system by July 31, 1997. July 3 1,1997 was the deadline by which these reforms were to be reported to the Federal Maritime Commission.
1o See Response of Federal Maritime Commission and the United States of America to ApplicationFor Stay, No. 97-I 194 at 4 (FMC, 1997) (available from the Federal Maritime Commission).
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and Nippon Yusen Kaisha ("Japanese carriers"). On October 14, 1997, the
deadline for payment of accumulated sanctions passed. Because Japanese
carriers had defaulted on payment of $4 million in fines, the FMC ordered
the Coast Guard to detain Japanese containerships in U.S. harbors on
October 17, 1997.11 However, an agreement was eventually reached
between U.S. Departments of State and Transportation and Japanese
government officials regarding the reformation of the Japanese port
practices.' In light of this agreement, on October 27, 1997, the FMC
compromised with the Japanese carriers by agreeing that sanctions would be
paid only for the month of September, amounting to a total amount of $1.5
million in fees for the three carrier lines.' 3
Part II of this Comment will address important background
information, lending insight into the evolution of shipping into the
"containerization age,"' 14 U.S. shipping laws, and past exercises of Section
19 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Part III will address the FMC's
authority to interfere in collective-bargaining agreements extraterritorially
and the reasonableness of such action. Finally, Part IV will argue that this
problem would have been more fairly and wisely resolved through WTO
dispute resolution procedures.
II.. THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN SHIPPING, AND THE FEDERAL MARITIME
COMMISSION'S ROLE POLICING THIS ENVIRONMENT
A. The US. Government's Involvement in Foreign Shipping
The United States first became involved in policing foreign shipping
because of shipping conferences. 15 Shipping conferences are "association[s]
of ocean common carriers operating on the same route."' 6 Conferences were
created during the late 1800s in response to intense competition between
shipowners that was detrimental to their economic survival. 17 Shipowners
agreed to surrender certain rights to independent action in exchange for
protection from predatory competition from other shipowners in the
1 David E. Sanger, Agency Orders US. Ports to Bar Japanese Ships, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 17,1997, at Al.
12 FMC Responds to Progress in Resolving Japanese Port Dispute, FMC NEWS, Oct. 17, 1997, at 1.
13 FMC Settles Fees with Japanese Lines after U.S and Japanese Negotiators Come to Terms in
Port Dispute, FMC NEWS, Oct. 27, 1997, at 1.
'4 See infra Section 11, Part B.
1 LANE C. KENDALL & JAMES J. BUCKLEY, THE BUSINESS OF SHIPPING 269-88 (6th ed. 1994).
16 Id. at 439.
" Id. at 269.
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conference.18 In addition, rebates were given to those who agreed to give
their business exclusively to the respective conference.1 9
Shipping conferences were preferred by shipowners because they
served as a practical method for shipowners to assure continuity of service to
customers (shippers) with relatively uniform and stable rates-advantages not
provided in an environment where intense competition exists. 2° Conferencesprovided business stability to an otherwise unstable environment.2 1
United States officials were cynical towards the conference system
because of the restrictions placed on shipowners and conferences and the fact
that conference agreements conflicted with antitrust laws.22 In 1912, the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee of the House of Representatives(commonly known as the Alexander Committee) addressed these issues, and
determined that the conference system should be exempted from antitrust law,
subject to scrutiny by a regulatory agency (the Federal Maritime Board).
In response to the Alexander Committee's findings, the Shipping Board
was created in 1916 to exercise pre-implementation review of these conference
agreements and to monitor potential industry abuses.23 Today, the Federal
Maritime Commission, whose primary purpose is to encourage the
development and maintenance of a U.S. merchant marine, holds these
responsibilities.
24
B. Introduction to Containerization, and its Effect on Shipping
International ocean shipping is an integral part of the economic success
of nations because it is essential to each nation's competitiveness in
exporting and importing goods. Prior to the 1960s, most goods were
shipped as breakbulk cargo, which is loaded as single discrete units aboard
26 2carriers. Each transshipment required individual handling of each unit.27
However, with the development of "containerization" in the 1960s, wholediscrete units could be consolidated into one container that could then be
I Id.
9 Id. at 271.
20 Id. at 270.
21 Id. at 278.
22 Id. at 273.
23 Andrew M. Danas, Deregulation of the Liner System. The Creation of Countervailing Power in
Shippers as a Means to Control Oligopoly Market Power, 6 J. INT'L. L. Bus. 373, 378 (1984).24 KENDALL, supra note 15, at 402-03, 431 n.9.25 Danas, supra note 23, at 381.
26 See generally NLRB v. ILA, 447 U.S. 490, 495 (1980).
27 id.
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loaded and unloaded as a single unit.28 This process significantly reduced
the amount of time required for unloading and loading cargo.
29
Containerization was one of the most significant advances in the
shipping industry.30  Containerization opened the door to new ways of
transporting goods, intermodal transport in particular.3 1  In addition,
containerization addressed 4 key problems existing at the time: first, the time
and effort in handling cargo; second, the amount of theft and damage to
cargo; third, the time required to transport goods to intended destinations;
and, fourth, turn-a-round time in ports.
32
Despite gains in efficiency, containerization shifted the fundamental
roles in the industry. Containers can now be transported to and from ships
without longshoremen 33 having to handle any of the particular items being
shipped in each container.34 While this is quick and efficient, it has reduced
the need for, and reduced the job security of, longshoremen.3 5
Containerization created the opportunity for parties other than
longshoremen to be able to load, unload, stuff, and strip containers.
36
Instead of these activities taking place at the docks, containers are often
loaded at inland shipping points, transported to shipside, and loaded
aboard.37 Thus, longshoremen responsibilities are reduced.
The "Rules on Containers" 38 ("Rules") were formed by ports and
stevedoring unions in response to the lessening work-load caused by
"containerization." The Rules on Containers require that some cargo
containers owned or leased by marine shipping companies that otherwise
would be loaded or unloaded within the local port area (defined as
anywhere within a fifty mile radius of the port) instead must be loaded or
28 Danas, supra note 23, at 381.
29 DONALD F. WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOGISTIcs 77-78 (1995).
30 KENDALL, supra note 15, at 199.
"' Id. Intermodal Transport denotes "a systems approach to transportation whereby goods are carried
in a continuous through movement between origin and destination using two or modes of transportation in
the most efficient manner." KENDALL, supra note 15, at 441.
32 KENDALL, supra note 15, at 222.
33 "Longshoremen" are "[d]ock laborers who actually perform the loading and discharging of cargo
from ships. KENDALL, supra note 15, at 442.
14 ILA v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890, 892 (D.C. Cir., 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 490 (1980).
" Id. at 892-93.
36 Loading cargo into a container is called "stuffing;" unloading cargo from a container is called
"stripping."
37 KENDALL, supra note 15, at 187.
38 See New York Shipping Ass'n. v. ILA, 854 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988); California Cartage Co. v.
NLRB, 822 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1987); NLRB v. ILA, 447 U.S. 490 (1980) [hereinafter ILA I]; NLRB v.
ILA, 473 U.S. 61 (1985) [hereinafter ILA I1]; American Trucking Ass'n, 734 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Council of North Atlantic Shipping Ass'n. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 672 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 890 U.S. 261 (1968).
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unloaded by longshoremen at the pier. 39  These collective-bargaining
agreements are considered "work preservation agreements," thus permitted
under Section 8(b)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. ° Under the
"work preservation doctrine," efforts to preserve work for employees
displaced by technological innovation are permitted activities under the
National Labor Relations Act.4' However, activities and agreements that
seek to acquire work of other employees are considered unlawful under the
42congressional proscription.
C. FMC Involvement in Collective Bargaining Agreements
The Rules on Containers were the subject of great dispute, not only
as to whether the Rules were exempted under congressional proscriptions
against unfair labor practices, but also because the FMC sought to
"police" the "Rules" under their shipping statutes.43 As a result of these
disputes, the FMC has been left with what amounts to a broad authority to
involve itself in labor matters where collective bargaining agreements
affect competition "directly and substantially," and if the problems clearly
predominate over labor interests raised by the agreements. 4  However,
the FMC does recognize its limits, and has recognized the existence of
labor exemptions in cases where FMC intervention is not vital to
enforcement of its legislative mandate.45 The FMC recognizes that the
labor-management agreements are permitted the full scope of labor-
management discretion in arriving at the agreements, but will assert itsjurisdiction when such agreements prevent the proper exercise of FMC
authority under the shipping statutes.46
" See ILA v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir.. 1979), afid, 447 U.S. 490 (1980) (explaining the
"Rules on Containers").
40 See lLA 1 447 U.S. at 81.
4 Id. at 75.
42 Id. at 81.
43 See New York Shipping Ass'n, 672 F.2d at 1338; California Cartage Co., 822 F.2d at 1203; ILA 1;
ILA 11; American Trucking Ass 'n, 734 F.2d at 966; Council of North Atlantic Shipping Ass 'n, 672 F.2d at
171; Volkswagenwerk 890 F.2d at 261 (1968).44 George H. Hearn, Recent Law of the Federal Maritime Commission and Collective Bargaining, 6
J. MAR. L. & CoM. 31, 32-33 (1974).
" Id. at 46.46 Id.; see also New York Shipping Ass'n. v. FMC, 854 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding FMCjurisdiction to review the "Rules on Containers," and finding that the "Rules" were unlawful under the
shipping laws).
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D. FMC Statutory Authority to Regulate Conditions Unfavorable to
Shipping in the Foreign Trade
Section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 authorizes the
Maritime Commission to act against conditions unfavorable to shipping in
the foreign trade.47 Section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act gives the FMC
wide authority:
to make rules and regulations affecting unfavorable 48 conditions
in shipping in the foreign trade... whether in any particular trade
or upon any particular route or in commerce generally, including
intermodal movements, terminal operations, ... which arise out
of or result from foreign laws, rules or regulations or from
competitive methods or practices employed by owners, operators,
agents, or masters of a vessel of a foreign country.
4 9
In investigating such practices, under 46 U.S.C. App. § 876 (6), the
FMC may require any person, common carrier, tramp operator.., to file with
the Commission a report, answers to questions, documentary material, or other
information which the Commission considers necessary or appropriate.
If the Commission finds that conditions are unfavorable to shipping
under 46 U.S.C. App. § 876(1)(b), the Commission has five courses of
action available. First, the FMC may "limit sailings to and from U.S.
ports." 50 Second, the FMC may "suspend, in whole or in part, tariffs filed
with the Commission for carriage to or from United States ports."'" Third,
the FMC may "suspend, in whole or in part, an ocean common carrier's
rights to operate under an agreement filed with the Commission. ' ' 2 Fourth,
the FMC may "impose a fee, not to exceed $1,000,000 per voyage." 53 In
addition, finally, the FMC may "take any other action the Commission finds
necessary and appropriate to adjust or meet any condition unfavorable to
shipping in the foreign trade of the United States."
54
47 46 U.S.C. app. § 876(1)(b)(1994).
4g The FMC defines conditions as unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade in broad terms. The FMC
may determine conditions to be unfavorable if the conditions are discriminatory, different from those imposed
on other vessels competing in the trade, unfair as between shipping entities, or if the conditions are "otherwise
unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade of the United States." 40 C.F.R. § 585.301(6)(c) (1998).
' 46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (1)(b) (1994).
50 46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (9)(a).
11 46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (9)(b).
52 46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (9)(c).
53 46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (9)(d).
54 46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (9)(e).
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In addition, upon request by the Commission, the collector of customs
at the port or place of destination in the United States shall refuse clearance
to a vessel of a country that is named in a rule or regulation issued by the
Commission under Section 19.55 The Secretary of the department in which
the Coast Guard is operating shall deny entry to any port or place in the
United States or the navigable waters of the United States. 6 The Secretary
may also detain that vessel at the port or place in the United States from
which it is about to depart. 57
E. Use of Sanctions Under Section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920
Until 1997, the Federal Maritime Commission had never imposed
sanctions on a foreign government, foreign flag operators, or other entities. 8
The FMC had, however, threatened the use of sanctions, under Section 19 of
the Merchant Marine Act, in some instances. Examples of incidents in
which the imposition of sanctions was contemplated, either in proposed rules
or suspended final rules, include actions taken in the United States-Korea
trade (NVOCCs 59 and intermodal matters60 ), United States-Taiwan trade,61
and the United States-Venezuelan trade.62 Though sanctions were proposed
in each of these situations, the threats of sanctions were removed once the
unfavorable conditions were corrected.63
Unlike these past threats of sanctions, the FMC actually imposed
sanctions on the Japanese liner operators, and the liner operators were
actually required to pay $1.5 million in fines. The sanctions were imposed
based on unfavorable restrictive port practices in Japanese ports.64  These
55 46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (10)(a).
56 46 U.S.C. app. § 876 (10)(b).
57 id.
5s See Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Maritime Commission Trade Actions, (Mar. 1997)(unpublished manuscript available on file with the Federal Maritime Commission)[hereinafter Federal
Maritime Actions].
59 id.
60 Actions to Adjust or Meet Conditions Unfavorable to Shipping in the United States/Korea Trade,
26 S.R.R. 585 (Nov. 13, 1992), in Federal Maritime Actions.61 Actions to Address Adverse Conditions Affecting United States Carriers in the United
States/Taiwan Trade, 25 S.R.R. 1690 (Oct. 1I, 1991), in Federal Maritime Actions.62 Actions to Adjust or Meet Conditions Unfavorable to Shipping in the United States/Venezuela
Trade, 26 S.R.R. 204 (March 25, 1992), in Federal Maritime Actions.61 See 26 S.R.R. 585; 25 S.R.R. 1690; 26 S.R.R. 204; Actions to Adjust or Meet Conditions Unfavorable
to Shigping in the United States/Korea Trade, 26 S.R.R. 591 (Nov. 13, 1992), in Federal Maritime Actions
The imposition of unilateral sanctions is unlike the efforts of the European Union, who in response
to restrictive port practices, has sought resolution of such practices through World Trade Organization
proceedings. EU/Japan: EU Bides Time with Japan on Harbour Rules, EUR. REP., Sept. 10, 1997,
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practices included 1) port requirements that do not allow shipping lines to
make operational changes without the permission of JHTA, 2) the JHTA's
absolute and unappealable discretion to withhold permission for the
proposed operational changes, 3) the lack of written criteria for JHTA
decisions, 4) threats by the JHTA to use its authority to punish and disrupt
the business operations of its detractors, 5) JHTA use of its authority to
extract fees and impose operation restrictions, such as Sunday work limits,
6) the JHTA's use of "prior consultation" authority to allocate work among
its member companies, by barring carriers and consortia from freely
choosing or switching operators and by compelling shipping liners to hire
additional, unneeded stevedore companies or contractors, 7) the Government
of Japan's restrictive licensing standard which prevents new entrants from
entering into Japan's stevedoring industry and, 8) the inability of U.S.
carriers to perform stevedoring or terminal operating services in Japan
because of Japanese licensing requirements, while Japanese carriers (or their
related companies or subsidiaries) can conduct such activities in Japan and
in the United States.65
American President Lines and Sea-Land Service, both U.S. liner
operators, had urged the FMC to impose sanctions. In addition, the carriers
noted "that the European Commission, at the behest of European carriers,
had urged the Government of Japan for years to secure the elimination of
port restrictions," and that the $100,000 sanctions are "an assessment which
is far less than the economic impact on the U.S. carriers of the cumulative
adverse effects of the prior consultation system, that is, the abuse of
unbridled market power by the harbor services industry in Japan."
66
In contrast, the Japanese liner operators, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines
("MOL"), Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha ("K-Line"), and Nippon Yusen Kaisha
("NYK"), argued 1) that they are private companies, 2) that they are not in
control of policies of the Ministry of Transport ("MOT"), the Japanese
governmental body that regulates such matters, and, 3) that they "deplore a
statutory application which would punish [them] irrespective of the lawful
character of [their] carrier operations in the Japan-U.S. oceanborne trades." 67
Furthermore, the Japanese carriers argued that the role of the MOT was not
properly characterized because the MOT treats prior consultation
negotiations as matters for the private sector, except when they break down,
available in 1997 WL 13046469.
65 See Port Restrictions, Final Rule.
66 id.
67 Id.
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and that under Japanese laws there is a policy of non-interference in
employer-union bargaining.
68
III. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION'S
IMPOSITION OF UNILATERAL SANCTIONS
As discussed, Section 19 is intended to be applied extraterritorially.
In the current case involving the Japanese carriers, the matter of whether
this jurisdiction authorizes the FMC to reach into the internal labor matters
of Japan is an important issue. Under the broad authority granted in the
statute, and U.S. courts' standards for reviewing statutes, it seems that the
FMC's action was legally permissible. But, in light of the sensitive nature
of the U.S. intrusion into the internal labor matters of Japan, the U.S.
Government and the FMC should seek fairer, and more credible
mechanisms, when they seek reform in these delicate situations, such as
through the World Trade Organization.
A. Judicial Review
Judicial review of FMC Section 19(1)(B) actions is authorized under 28
U.S.C. § 2342(3)(b)(i), which states "[t]he court of appeals .. .has exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine
the validity of ... all rules, regulations, or final orders of ... the Federal
Maritime Commission issued pursuant to Section 19 of the Merchant Marine
Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. App. § 876) . . ,,69 Because the FMC is an
administrative body, the standard of judicial review is set out in Chevron v.
National Resources Defense Council.70  Under Chevron, an agency's
construction of a statute is reviewed first by looking to the statute in
71'7question. If that statute is clear on its face, then the Court's review ends.72
If, however, Congress has not directly addressed the issue in question, the
Court will determine whether the agency's application was a permissible
construction of the statute.73 The agency's application must be set forth by
68 id.
6' 28 U.S.C. § 2342(3)(b)(i) (1994).
70 Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
"' Id. at 842.
72 Id. at 842.
71 Id. at 843.
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regulation.74 Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
75
Section 19(1)(B) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was intended
to be applied extraterritorially. 76 This act was amended in 1991 to further
identify intermodal movements, terminal operations, and other shipping-
related activities as activities that are within the review and regulation of
the FMC.77
Because of the broad language of the statute, the FMC's jurisdiction to
issue sanctions over the Japanese carriers, under U.S. law, cannot be
questioned. Though the JHTA argues that its abuses are purely private sector
matters, the FMC specifically noted in its Final Rule that, "in accordance with
Japanese laws and regulations, JHTA operates with the permission of, and
under the supervision of the Ministry of Transportation ("MOT"), which can
annul JHTA's incorporation if it acts contrary to the public interest.78 MOT is
also authorized to give oversight or guidance, as confirmed by the Japanese
carriers, to bring about the "restoration, improvement, and continuance" of the
system.79 Moreover, "the MOT is vested with broad regulatory authority over
JHTA member companies, including licensing authority and the right to
disapprove rates and business plans."
80
Alternatively, if a court were to find the statute unclear as to this
particular issue, the court would then be required to determine whether the
FMC's action was "arbitrary and capricious."' 1  However, the 'FMC's
identification of conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade
would seem to make a finding that the FMC's action was "arbitrary and
capricious" difficult to establish. First, under the Japanese port system, U.S.
carriers are unable to obtain licenses from the MOT, giving U.S. carriers no
choice but to submit their shoreside planning and operations to JHTA
control.82 This licensing system protects the existing Japanese firms from
competition with U.S. and other foreign companies.83 Secondly, the JHTA's
pre-prior consultation requirement, which allows the JHTA to arbitrarily
permit or deny carriers access to the prior consultation process, gives the
" Id. at 844.
75 Id.
76 See 46 U.S.C. § 876(l)(b) (1994), which states that the FMC is authorized "[tjo make rules and
regulations affecting shipping in the foreign trade ... which arise out of foreign laws, rules ......
77 Id.
71 See Port Restrictions, Final Rule.
79 Id.
80 Id.
S Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
82 See Port Restrictions, Final Rule.
83 Id.
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JHTA extraordinary leverage which it uses to prevent competition and
maintain agreed-upon allocation of work among member companies.
84
Section 19 is not clear as to whether it was intended to allow the FMC
to interfere with collective bargaining within another country. The court, in
applying the Chevron standard, must look to determine whether the agency's
construction of the statute was "reasonable." 85 The issue is whether the
FMC's application of Section 19 to reform labor matters within Japan was
"reasonable" under the statute.
Congressional intent supports the position that the FMC's action was
reasonable. In amending Section 19 in 1991, Congress recognized that the
FMC should interpret Section 19 broadly.86 It is also clear that Congress
intended to enlarge, or at least clarify, the scope of Section 19 authority to
include "intermodal movements and certain land-based activities which are
integral to shipping. 87  The amendment was created to give the FMC
broadened authority to act until "all unfair trading practices are eliminated
from the international maritime trade [emphasis added]. 8 8 Additionally,
after the Japanese sanctions were issued, the Senate acknowledged its
support of the FMC's actions.89 Such broad language indicates that the
FMC's authority is intended to be all-inclusive of any activities which the
FMC interprets to be "unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade,"
regardless of whether the matters are domestic or international in nature.
B. FMC Authority to Review Collective-Bargaining Agreements
Federal courts have held that the FMC has the authority to review
collective bargaining agreements, and to find them unlawful, when such
agreements interfere into the province afforded the FMC under the shipping
statutes.9° Thus, even if collective-bargaining agreements, such as the
"Rules on Containers," are upheld as lawful under the National Labor
Relations Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the FMC has the
authority to determine whether these types of agreements violate FMC
84 id.
85 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.86 135 CONG. REC. E2868 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (Statement of Rep. Lent).
87 Id.
88 Id.89 See S. Res. 140, 15th Cong. (1997) (enacted). Though this resolution was brought after the fact,
courts have shown that pronouncements as to the meaning of previously enacted statutes may be
appropriate for guidance in appropriate circumstances. See Takazato v. FMC, 633 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th
Cir. 1979) (supporting pronouncements of legislative committees of previously enacted statutes).9' Council of North Atlantic Shipping Ass'n. v. FMC, 672 F.2d 171, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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laws.9 1 The FMC may be invading the province of the National Labor
Relations Board, but the federal courts have held that the FMC may do so in
carrying out its statutory mandate.92
In New York Shipping Ass 'n. v. FMC, a District of Columbia Federal
Court of Appeals upheld the FMC's authority to review and prohibit collective
bargaining agreements under the Shipping Act of 1916.9 In supporting the
FMC's ruling, the Court focused on whether interference with the federal labor
laws was unavoidable in carrying out FMC proscriptions under the shipping
statutes.94 The federal court upheld the FMC's decision noting that, in
regulating tariffs, which included the agreements on the "Rules on
Containers," the FMC was carrying out its primary role in protecting carriers,
shippers, and ports from unfair or discriminatory practices.
95
The FMC's action was upheld, but the court did not apply a Chevron
analysis, and did not give the FMC deference in interpreting the meaning of
a shipping law by using a Chevron analysis.96 The court refused to yield to
the interpretation of the FMC because the FMC was not interpreting the
statute in the administration of its shipping laws, but, rather, interpreted the
statute as delimiting the FMC's authority. 97 The court stated: "[I]t would be
inappropriate for us to defer to the agency, where, as here, it is interpreting
not the meaning of a statute that Congress charged it to administer, but
rather a statute merely delimiting its jurisdiction as against that of the
authorities charged with the administration of the labor laws."
98
The specific FMC action under the statute here does not seek to
delimit the FMC's authority, but the "administration" of Section 19. The
FMC would then have broader deferential authority under Section 19 than it
had under the Shipping Act's delimiting language in New York Shipping
Ass 'n. v. FMC because the focus is on the "administration" of a shipping
law, rather than an interpretation of the limits to such authority.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 New York Shipping Ass'n v. FMC, 854 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
94 Id. at 1363-64.
9 Id. at 1374-75.
96 Id. at 1363.
97 id.
98 Id.
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C. Policy Implications of FMC Regulation of Extraterritorial Collective-
Bargaining Agreements
The FMC's imposition of sanctions in this case demonstrates the
hypocrisy of U.S. lawmaking. FMC regulation, though lawful under U.S.
statutes, serves to intrude into the domestic matters of another sovereign
nation. The FMC action here is much more abrasive than FMC involvement
in domestic, collective bargaining matters. Here, the collective-bargaining
matters took place within a foreign country, and the FMC action is not just
interfering with federal labor laws, but foreign labor laws.
The sanctions were imposed based on unfavorable restrictive port
practices in Japanese ports. Japan supports a policy of non-interference with
employer-employee labor matters; this is a policy similar to what exists in
the United States.99  The FMC's action illustrates a situation where the
United States government policies would support such arrangement here in
the United States, but invalidate the same type of action when such
arrangements exist in a foreign country-a double-standard in U.S.
lawmaking. 10 Furthermore, the acceptance of FMC interference with
domestic collective-bargaining agreements does not justify FMC
interference with how a sovereign nation addresses its internal labor matters.
NLRB v. Int 'l Longshoremen's Ass 'n. ("ILA II") is an example of how
the problem would be addressed in the United States.' ° ' In that case, the
Supreme Court reviewed issue of whether the "Rules on Containers," adopted
in U. S. ports, were valid work-preservation agreements. These rules were
created as a result of a reduction in the amount of work available for
longshoremen, as shipping companies furthered the practice of loading and
unloading their containers away from piers through freight consolidators who
combined the goods of various shippers into a single shipment.' 0 2 The rules
required that if containers owned or leased by shipping companies were to be
stuffed or stripped locally by anyone other than the employees of the beneficial
owner of the cargo, that work had to be done at the piers by ILA labor. 0 3
99 See Port Restrictions, Final Rule.
1oo See Cockroft Hits at FMC in Ports Row, LLOYD'S LIST, Sept. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7495523 (criticizing the hypocrisy of some in the U.S. administration and other govemments, as well as
world bodies such as the WTO and the IMF, for using the "free trade should be separate from social and
labor issues" argument on some occasions and not on others. "We consider this an appalling interference
in the rights of Japanese government and unions to regulate their own affairs.").
1o' NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n., 473 U.S. 61 (1985).
102 Id. at 65.
1o3 ILA 1, 447 U.S. 490 (1980). In this case, the court addressed whether the NLRB, in determining
the permissibility of the "Rules on Containers" under federal labor law, properly reviewed the matter. The
Court held that the NLRB failed to consider the surrounding circumstances, such as whether the union's
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In ILA II, the Supreme Court's test was whether the union's objective
was directed toward a "secondary purpose," a purpose beyond work-
preservation (e.g. work-acquisition). 10 4  The Court acknowledged that no
dispute existed as to the fact that the rules were directed towards the
preservation of jobs against the diminishing volume of work for
longshoremen.
0 5
In the United States, arrangements similar to those that exist in
Japanese ports would be protected from unlawful interference by the
National Labor Relations Board as valid work-preservation agreements.'
0 6
The gist of the FMC's complaint is against the "prior consultation
requirement" and the discretion the JHTA has in determining port
requirements in Japan.'0 7  These conditions are not a creation of
government, but of private, labor-management relations that take place
among the various shipping associations in Japanese ports.'0 8 The system
had been in effect since 1986, and was developed "to prevent labor unrest
and to protect the jobs of harbor workers."' 1 9 Such a long-standing system
was developed as an effort to maintain work levels after the industry
shifted from labor-intensive breakbulk to containerized cargo."l0 Japanese
carriers argue that "the system was created to maintain labor stability and
avoid the need for face to face confrontations between carriers and
unions," in response to "containerization.""' The Japanese carriers point
out that "the inauguration of container service, which occurred in the
1960s and 1970s, raised serious issues and led to disruption in waterfront
labor relations in many maritime nations, including the U.S.""' 2 This
objective was for the purpose of work preservation, and thus remanded the case. The issue of whether the
Rules on Containers are lawful under the NLRA was brought forward in ILA II, 473 U.S. 61 (1985), to
determine whether such agreements are lawful under the NLRA.
104 ILA I, 473 U.S. at 81.
o5 Id. at 79.
'06 See ILA I; ILA I1.
107 See Port Restrictions, Final Rule.
log The two labor groups, the Japan Shipowner's Association and the Japan Foreign Steamship
Association, contend that the prior consultation system is a private-sector, labor-management agreement.
Furthermore, the groups maintain that a decision reached on a review without participation of the labor
unions violates the International Labor Organization Treaty guaranteeing the right to collective bargaining.
Port Workers go on 24-hour Strike at 50 Ports, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, Nov. 24, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
'09 Application for Stay Order of Federal Maritime Commission, No. 97-1194 at 12 (D.C. Cir., 1997)
(available from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; also available from
the Federal Maritime Commission).
11 FMC Probing Japanese Port Practices for Bias Toward U.S. Flag Carriers, TRAFFIC WORLD,
Sept. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
. See Port Restrictions, Final Rule. See also Application for Stay Order of Federal Maritime
Commission, No. 97-1194 at 12 (D.C. Cir., 1997).112 Id.
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system has been defended as necessary because employment situations can
be influenced by decisions where to load and unload cargoes as well as by
decisions on which cargo-handling companies will be used by shipping
firms. 113  Thus, the primary intention of the collective-bargaining
agreements is the preservation of work, as in ILA H.
The FMC has not established that the Japanese port practices were
created with a purpose of excluding non-Japanese carriers. Instead, the
detrimental effects upon U.S.-foreign carriers may be more reasonably
explained as the "incidental effects of primary activity," which the Supreme
Court in ILA H upheld as lawful in the United States.' 14 For the U.S. to
allow such activity within U.S. borders but to prohibit it when done by
foreign governments illustrates a double standard in U.S. lawmaking." 5
It should also be noted that in ILA II, the court recognized that the
"Rules" represented "a negotiated compromise of a volatile problem bearing
directly on the well-being of our national economy."" 6 The FMC has not
taken account of any economic effect on the Japanese economy, and it is not
required to. However, if the well being of a nation's economy is a factor to
be considered in determining the permissibility of work-preservation
agreements, it seems at least reasonable that the U.S. should respect Japan's
sovereignty in protecting the effect on Japan's economy. Instead, the FMC
has shown no such regard.
The FMC's imposition of unilateral sanctions has been called a
"bludgeon" attempt at correcting the port practices in Japan."I7 In response
to the unilateral actions of the FMC, "Japan's Diet passed a law authorizing
immediate retaliation if a foreign government fines Japanese carriers or
denies them access to ports."'"18  Furthermore, Japanese government
ministers have attacked the actions by hinting at the possibility of a negative
impact on overall Japan-U.S. trade ties.' 9 Analogizing the FMC's Section
113 id.
1'4 ILA Hat 84.
"' The United States would probably object if another country sought to regulate its internal labor
matters by sanctioning U.S. private businesses.
Washington's choice of three ship lines as targets smacks of arbitrariness. Those carriers may
benefit from the JHTA system, but so do many other Japanese companies. One can only guess
how Washington would react if, for example, a foreign government were to hit three U.S.
companies to protest a U.S. business practice.
Opening Japan's Ports, J. COM., Apr. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library Cumws File.
116 ILA Hat 84.
117 Opening Japan's Ports, supra note 115, at 6A.
Is Japan Reacts to FMC Port Sanctions, AM. SHIPPER, Feb. 1998, at 57.
119 Anthony Rowley, Japanese Ministers and Shipowners Blast U.S. Move, BUS. TIMES (Singapore),
Feb. 28, 1997, at I.
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19 usage to Section 301, another unilateral trade remedy which has been
heavily criticized by foreign governments, the FMC played both "prosecutor
and judge, in which defendant's are tried in absentia, and in which Congress
... ordained certain guilty verdicts in advance ... .,,'20 Ironically, it has also
been argued that even the Executive Branch was taken by surprise, and was
put "in a tenuous position where it was pressured into supporting the stance
of the FMC, though the administration clearly sought to take action by less
abrasive measures."1 2 1  Because Japanese government ministers have
conceded that the port practices could be reformed,122 collaborative efforts,
rather than such aggressive and unilateral efforts taken by the FMC, might
work better in such situations.
The Japanese liner operators also seek deregulation and greater
transparency in Japanese ports.12 3  However, such action must be taken
cautiously. 124 If deregulation and liberalization of the ports takes place too
rapidly, the risk of cartels, monopolies, or excessive competition could
result.' 25 Deregulation takes coordination, rather than conflict.'
26
When the U.S. takes such action it reinforces the belief that our
country is not interested in a "fair" international system of resolving
disputes, but a system which only serves the United States' best interests.
Under such circumstances, the credibility of the United States in recognizing
the sovereignty of other nations, and in supporting the resolution of
international disputes through multilateral methods, is called into question.
The United States should support a more credible alternative, such as a
multilateral method of dispute resolution.
120 Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 114 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
121 David LaGesse, Dispute Might Bar Many Japanese Ships From American Ports, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 17, 1997, at IA.
122 Linda Sieg, Japan Agrees Port Practices Need to be Reformed, Reuters (Far East), Feb. 28, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
123 Bradley Martin, Japanese Lines Also Want Port Deregulation, J. COM., Sept. 16, 1998, at I IA.
124 id.
125 Id.
126 Id. Interestingly, the U.S. has engaged in a similar investigation of Chinese port policies under §
19 of the Merchant Marine Act. FMC Launches Inquiry into Chinese Shipping Policies, FMC, Aug. 12,
1998, at NR 98-03. Like the Japanese government and carriers, Chinese authorities seek negotiation rather
than confrontation to reach a solution. David Taylor, China Hopes to Resolve Dispute with U.S. Amicably,
BUS. TIMES (Singapore), Sept. I, 1998, at I.
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IV. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO UNILATERAL MEASURES
Though neither maritime nor shipping conditions are presently
"covered" under the WTO's jurisdiction, 127 undoubtedly such delicate matters
would be more fairly and wisely adjudicated under an impartial, multilateral
body. I28 Without a clear showing that the Japanese government, Japan Harbor
Transportation Authority, or Japanese carriers intended to create conditions
"unfavorable to shipping" in the U.S. or foreign trade, the Japanese system is
really just an internal domestic labor matter which incidentally effects
international shipping conditions. For the U.S. and the FMC to attempt to
unilaterally reform such conditions is an impingement on Japanese
sovereignty. 129 In light of the seriousness of the problem, common sense
dictates that such matters would be more fairly resolved by an international,
impartial body, than through an independent agency, such as the FMC. In
light of the seriousness of the reforms being sought, and the inherent bias from
which the FMC works, 130 it would be more reasonable in the future to address
such matters by multilateral dispute resolution procedures, such as WTO
dispute resolution mechanisms. I31
The WTO would have provided a fairer mechanism for review of
Japan's allegedly restrictive port practices. First, the WTO would have
provided certain procedural advantages in providing for a fair and timely
adjudication of the issues. 132  Secondly, by addressing the matter throughWTO procedures, the U.S. would have decreased the abrasiveness of its
'2' The WTO has determined certain "covered" areas for which member countries have agreed tohave adjudicated before WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies ("DSB"). For a list of "covered agreements" seeAgreements Covered by the Understanding, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WorldTrade Organization, Appendix I, 33 I.L.M. 1244 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding].128 The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") emphasizes dispute resolution throughimpartial Dispute Settlement Bodies ("DSBs"). See Understanding Annex 2. This matter is not currently
addressable under the WTO dispute resolution; rather, this comment is an illustration and argument why
maritime shipping services should be brought within the WTO agreements, or other multilateral dispute
resolution mechanism.
129 It should be noted that the Japanese government concurs that the port conditions need to be changed;however, for the U.S. to be forcing the issue is another matter which impinges on Japanese sovereignty.
:30 See supra Section Ill.
31 On October 17, 1997, the United States and Japan reached an agreement as to the following reforms:I) the creation of an expedited licensing process for American ships entering Japan ports; 2) the creation of an
altemative system so U.S. shippers can negotiate with terminal operators directly without having to go through
"traditional" port procedures," such as the "prior consultation" requirement; and, 3) the assurance of theJapanese government that it will make efforts to give the reforms a fair chance to become effective. Martin
Crutsinger, US-Japan Trade Pact Brings Huge Relief S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 18, 1997, at A-16.
132 See Understanding art. 17.
VOL. 8 No. I
JANUARY 1999 JAPANESE MARITIME DISPUTE RESOLUTION
actions in seeking to reform Japanese port practices.' 33  Third, by
adjudicating the matter before the WTO, the U.S. could have legitimized
its commitment to a multilateral trading system.'
34
If this matter were brought before the WTO, certain procedural
mechanisms would be working to provide for fairer review of Japan's
allegedly restrictive port practices.'3 First, the Dispute Settlement Body
would establish a panel of three appointed members who must serve in
their "individual capacities," and not as "government representatives.", 
36
Objectivity is the focus of panel functions in making findings of facts and
determinations as to whether "covered agreements" have been violated.1
37
Thus, under such a system, the political bias of FMC officials would not
be a problem.' 38 Second, decisions of a Dispute Settlement Body could be
appealed to the Appellate Body, allowing for further review of the issue.
139
These procedural advantages are provided within certain time
frames. Upon complaint, and request for a panel, a panel must be
established by the earliest Dispute Settlement Body meeting, or upon
request, within fifteen days of a request for the convening of a Dispute
Settlement Body meeting.' 40  Written submissions to the panel must be
submitted for immediate transmission to the panel. 141  The panel has six
months to issue its report, 142 unless the Dispute Settlement Body is
informed of reasons why it is not possible. 43 Upon issuance of the panel
report, member countries have sixty days to formally notify the Dispute
' See Opening Japan's Ports, J. CoM., Apr. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File
(comparing the EU's actions in going to the WTO to a "large scalpel," and U.S.'s measures to a "bludgeon.")
' 4 The WTO's "Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization" agree to support the
objective of developing a more viable and durable multilateral trading system, and reducing barriers to
trade. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. at 1144. It should be noted that
the European Union has filed a complaint with the WTO about the same restrictive port practices the U.S.
has complained about. The U.S. has sought to encourage other nations to pursue such procedures, and has
historically been one of the biggest benefactors of WTO dispute resolution. See Stuart S. Malawer, New
Agreements and Cases in the WTO, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 1998, "Outside Counsel Section" at 1. For the U.S.
to attempt these matters unilaterally shows a lack of confidence in the WTO dispute resolution process, and
a lack of commitment towards a multilateral system of dispute resolution. See also William A. Niskanen,
Testing WTO's Limits, J. COM., Nov. 4, 1997, at 8A.
For the purposes of this Comment, references to "covered" agreements is meant to hypothetically
assume that if "maritime/shipping" agreements were covered under the WTO, certain advantages for the U.S.
and Japanese carriers would be present which are not present currently under unilateral efforts by the U.S.
:36 Understanding art. 8(9).
37 Understanding art. 11.
13s See Japan Trade Row Escalates, LLOYD's Lis r, Sept. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4465230.
139 See Understanding art. 17.
1 Understanding art. 6(1).
41 Understanding art. 12(6).
142 Understanding art. 12(8).
143 Understanding art. 12(9).
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Settlement Body of their intention to appeal. 144 The Appellate Body then
has sixty days to render its final report.' 4
Under such procedural safeguards, the U.S. and Japanese
governments could be assured of an impartial settlement of the matter.
Furthermore, both member countries could rely on the matter being settled
within certain time frames. The WTO dispute resolution procedures are thus
inherently fairer than might be offered under unilateral actions by a
country's independent agency.
In addition to arguing that the unilateral sanctions are permissible
under Section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act, the FMC justified its
imposition of sanctions because "genuine progress may be possible ...
and workable reforms may well be at hand."'146 However, after more than
a year after the FMC's imposition of sanctions, the anticipated reforms
have not materialized.1
47
In light of the seriousness of the FMC's imposition of sanctions, and
the ineffectiveness of this solution, a multilateral dispute resolution system
like that used by the WTO, may be a more effective alternative in the future.
"The WTO creates a predictable and conducive global legal system to
enhance trade relations among states ... The purpose of the WTO's dispute
resolution process is to create a binding and compulsory quasi-judicial
system. ' ' 148 When the U.S., one if its major litigants, takes advantage of the
WTO's dispute resolution procedures, and complies with such decisions, the
U.S., as well as the WTO, gain credibility with foreign governments.149
On the other hand, when the U.S. disguises aggressive unilateralism
behind the mask of "complex practices," unilateral sanctions are more
likely to subvert the WTO's authority in the area of world trade. 150
"[U]nilateral action is now largely unnecessary due to the negotiation of
comprehensive substantive agreements and the development of a rule-
oriented dispute resolution process. Moreover, unilateral action is
detrimental to the world trading system in an interdependent world. 15 "
When the U.S. deals with its complaints regarding another country's
domestic activities in this manner, the U.S. illustrates its indecisive
:44 Understanding art. 16(4).
145 Understanding art. 17(5).
146 Response of Federal Maritime Commission and the United States of America to Application for
Stay, No. 97-1194, at 18 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
147 Bradley Martin, Japan Ports Still a Thorn for US Shippers, J. COM., Sept. 15, 1998, at IA.41 See Stuart S. Malawer, WTO: A Quiet Success, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997, at S42.149 Id.
'5' Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use ofSection 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233, 287 (1996).
IS? Id. at 281.
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approach to policy goals, and sends the message to other foreign
governments that unilateral action is still the preferred behavior over
adjudication through multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms.
V. CONCLUSION
The FMC's imposition of unilateral sanctions under Section 19 of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was an inappropriate method of resolving the
Japanese port practice dispute. Though the FMC has the authority to take
such action under Section 19, imposing such authority, in this context,
illustrates a double standard in U.S. law making. Besides the fact that the
Japanese carriers did not have control of the port practices in dispute, the
FMC imposed these sanctions to reform labor-management agreements
within another country. In addition, because a very delicate situation is
created when the United States government interferes in this area, an
unbiased, multilateral dispute resolution body would more fairly resolve
such disputes. Through multilateral dispute resolution, like the World Trade
Organization's dispute resolution panel, the U.S. could provide a fair forum
for dialogue and resolution while also enhancing its credibility in supporting
multilateral dispute resolution.

